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ABSTRACT
From the research undertaken, cost elasticity and normal profits suggest there may exist a
series of quality/cost curves which determine the level and type of supply which enters
the market in response to demand and the willingness for participants to pay for a unit of
quality. The dynamics of supply in the Commercial Office Market are considered within
the theoretical context of both equilibrium in the office market and urban land rent
theory.
Based upon over 44,000 records received from F.W. Dodge, summarizing the cost and
characteristics of commercial office buildings built in the U.S. since 1967, a hedonic
office replacement cost index is developed for sixteen Metropolitan Statistical Areas.
(These data are proprietary, and their use in this thesis is by permission.) The basis for
the index is the methodology popularized by both house price indices and a commercial
office rent index. Utilizing the output from the cost index, the elasticity of supply and
cost elasticity within the commercial office market are analyzed to provide a framework
for understanding the dynamics of supply. This research also provides a comparative
analysis with other popular industry-standard cost indices and compares the level of cost
with inflation. An example is provided which demonstrates the functional use of the
index to determine the level of rent necessary for the development of new supply.
Thesis Supervisor: William C. Wheaton
Title: Professor of Economics
Chairman, Interdepartmental Degree Program in Real Estate Development
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Chapter One
The question addressed is, can we construct a useful commercial office cost index which
will allow us to value "average" buildings over time, and allow us to develop a model
which would determine the minimum level of rents required for new development to
occur, given a range of building quality. Furthermore, by understanding the level of
prices in a market for an average building, will the cost series allows us to effectively
analyze the cost elasticity and the elasticity of supply in the commercial office market?
For investors and users of office space, such information can be critical for long term
decision making. For investors, if the supply is relatively elastic, how stable are rents if
new supply can enter the market with relative ease? Will the new supply compete with
the existing supply or will the new supply exist for a different segment of the market?
For the user of space, if supply is "highly" inelastic, is it better to incur a long term lease
at presumably relatively lower real rental rates. Conversely, if the supply is relatively
less inelastic, what is the option value for waiting for new space to enter the market and
thus secure comparable real rental rates but purchase a higher level of quality?
Furthermore, for accounting and insurance purposes, what cost represents a valid
"replacement cost" in any given year?
The various models that address demand in the commercial office market use the change
in vacancy to forecast trends in demand as well as indirectly capture changes in supply.
In the simplest sense, such models therefore assume that as long as vacancy trends
towards lower rates, the casual relationship with rents will cause increased returns. Such
an argument holds that so long as vacancy remains high and occupied space is low,
minimal construction should occur. If this is true, given the high levels of vacancy still
occurring, why did a city like Chicago add 1 billion dollars worth of space comprising
2.25 million square feet since 1990? This amount of new supply would represent an
obsolescence rate of 1.48% when various researchers (Barth, et al. 1990) estimate the
obsolescence rate at only 0.6%.
This analysis assumes two reasons for continued, and perhaps, excessive construction
activity in the presence of low obsolescence and high vacancy. First, with the onset of
technological advances, the rate of obsolescence seeks different levels across building
types and fluctuates over time. Secondly, owners of commercial office space chase yields
by capitalizing the rent stream. From a developer's perspective, if the capitalized rent
exceeds the cost of construction, marketing, development and interest costs (and normal
profits are assured), then construction should take place (in this simplified net present
value argument). From an investor's perspective, if the capitalized rent and terminal
value of the asset exceed the purchase price and allow for normal profits given the risk of
the asset class, then the purchase should be made. But still, the efficient market
hypothesis suggests that users should bid down existing rents, absorb the excess supply
and that only minimal construction should occur. Do commercial office users pay
different rents based upon a level of "quality"?
1 1993 dollars.
By developing a replacement cost index controlled for quality and capitalizing the
replacement cost index, the level of rents necessary to bring about additions to supply can
be forecast. In conjunction with a rent index, we can forecast the changes in the
commercial office market. With respect to cost elasticity and the elasticity of supply,
given an average building type and a level of stock, we can estimate the relative elasticity
in order to make decisions regarding investments in a particular market.
Chapter two of the thesis will discuss the dynamics of office supply within the context of
urban land rent theory and office market equilibrium. The "four-quadrant model,"
developed by Wheaton and DiPasquale, will be presented to establish a framework for
how the supply of office space interacts with demand for both the user and the investor.
Chapter three discusses the data received by FW Dodge and considers the general trends
in the supply cycles of the office market over the past number of years.
Chapter four develops the methodology behind the replacement cost index. Extending
the principles of hedonic price indices for housing and rents for commercial office space,
an explanation will be given for the hedonic replacement cost index. The results of the
hedonic index are presented along with a description of the model parameters. An
explanation is provided which highlights and distinguishes the differences across
markets. The cost elasticity with respect to the individual building attributes are also
calculated and an explanation of the results is presented. Utilizing the index, a nominal
cost time series is presented for the Boston market which highlights the cost of a structure
based upon various quality characteristics. Given average building characteristics, the
office replacement cost index for each market is calculated and the results, on both a
nominal and real basis, are compared with the popular "Means Construction Cost Index."
Not surprisingly, there are striking differences between the Means Index and the
Replacement Cost Index. For the comparison, both indices are scaled to 1982.
In chapter five, the elasticity of supply is presented for certain markets along with a
preliminary model which forecasts the level of supply in selected markets. Chapter six
concludes the empirical analysis and suggests areas for further research.
Chapter Two
DYNAMICS OF OFFICE SUPPLY: EQUILIBRIUM
Presumably, the profitability of new development is dependent upon the cost of
construction, the cost of short term financing and the level and "speed" of demand in the
marketplace. Thus, the supply of space is a function of the level of stock, absorption,
vacancy, employment growth and rents. Addressing the supply of commercial office
space in its most basic form, we can look to both the "four-quadrant" model described by
Wheaton and DiPasquale2 as well as the theory of the urban land market as described by
Alonso.
As described in the four-quadrant model, from a supply perspective, equilibrium is
reached when capitalized net-rents equal the cost of construction. The supply function is
inelastic and the slope of the curve depends upon construction interest rates. At
equilibrium in the four-quadrant model, the amount of space supplied is a function of
both demand through the asset market as well as the obsolescence, physical depreciation
or abandonment of older lower-quality office space in the property market.
Economically, the marginal cost of replacing the depreciated stock will be a function of
the costs necessary to secure the resources (land, labor and capital) to build the space.
Applying a standard supply schedule, the cost of securing these resources increases as
other sectors in the economy bid for like resources. Presumably, the elasticity of the
2 Wheaton and DiPasquale (forthcoming).
supply schedule will vary across metropolitan areas and determine the relative cost of
these resources. In the model, this supply schedule depends upon the replacement cost of
the obsolete structure. To advance this theory, the level of the replacement cost in a
given year will embody advances in building technology and quality over time in a
rational market. That is to say, if the market were irrational, a developer might construct
a building today of inferior (though not necessarily lower) quality and thus a lower
replacement cost in order to capture abnormal profits. The assumption though is that the
users of such space do not survey the market for the lowest quality at the highest price.
Thus, we will assume an efficient demand market. Therefore, a rational developer will
increase quality at the margin in order to be competitive and secure rents.
In the supply quadrant, the cost for a "unit of quality," on a life-cycle basis, presumably
decreases. If we draw an analogy from the labor market, the "productivity of assets," in a
qualitative sense, increases over time for the office market. We can extend this to say,
while the quality delivered over the life of the asset may be higher than previously
experienced in structures of similar sizes and locations, the capital costs for "smart"
buildings, as an example, may indeed be lower in real terms. The assumption in this
thesis is that obsolescence is dynamic and to some degree, accounts for the continued
development of office space.
As a result of the massive supply created in the 80's, one might argue that this
obsolescence might also include suitable structures not put towards productive uses if
buildings were simply "built in the wrong place" during the 80's. One can certainly
question the logic of such an argument. However, despite the presence of historically low
rental rates during a period of an abundant supply of office space, the recent advance of
design-build projects (at a time when replacement costs exceed capitalized rental rates)
would seem to indicate that the discounted present value of location characteristics
outweigh the benefits of historically low rental rates. If such a hypothesis is valid, the
equilibrating function should result in a higher dynamic structural vacancy rate.
In his article forecasting office space needs for the year 2000,3 Birch identifies other types
of obsolescence as well, namely, "image-based obsolescence," in addition to
technological obsolescence. For the former, Birch indicates a continued demand for
prestigious buildings and locations. He sites as an example reallocations by Wall Street
investment banks. Such reallocations cause obsolescence over time as firms upgrade
their space. In response to obsolescence, landlords respond in one of three manners.
They can either upgrade their space (as in the Renaissance Tower, Dallas), convert their
space to a new use (Chicago Savings bank and Trust-converted to apartments), or
decrease rents. If we were to construct a series of "cost/quality" curves, the first example
above would be considered a shift of the curve in this negatively sloped function.
Increasing or decreasing rents, in contrast, would be a shift along the quality curve.
3 David L. Birch, et. al., "America's Future Office Space Needs: Preparing for the Year 2000,"
National Association of Industrial and Office Parks (1990), pp. 14-25.
In response to technological obsolescence, the onset of the information age placed
tremendous demands upon the infrastructure of a building. For example, if a structure
cannot accommodate the physical requirements of computer rooms, that is, independently
zoned air conditioning systems, stand-by generators and advanced electrical systems, then
those buildings will incur a form of "quality" obsolescence, distancing themselves from a
segment of the market. Birch gives an example of a building that was "cable-bound."
This structure simply did not have the room to install the necessary wiring demanded by a
firm's employees.
URBAN LAND RENT THEORY
With respect to obsolescence relative to location characteristics, Alonso states in his
theory of the urban land market4 , "a landowner purchases two goods - land and
location." In the simple agricultural model, profits derived from the land are based upon
location and the fixed cost of commuting and production. Assuming a competitive
market for the farmer's products as well an equal cost to produce the products, the profit,
or residual to the land received as a result of selling the product at market will be the sales
price less the cost of production and delivery. Since the cost of production is fixed, the
variable cost is the distance to the market times the unit cost per mile. In this theory, the
amount bid for a parcel of land is inversely related to the distance to the market. If a
farmer bids higher for the land than the location warrants, he will operate at a loss. Thus,
under this theory, normal profits are assured by all farmers.
4 William Alonso., "A Theory of The Urban Land Market,"
Papers and Proceedings of the Regional Science Association (Volume 6, 1960), pp. 14 9 -1 5 7
Extending this theory to differentiate between products, those products that command a
higher price at market can afford to pay more for land closer to the market if we assume
that profits are normal across all product types.5 In this fashion, a series of bid-rent
curves emerge. Firms receiving greater revenues based upon greater volume with equal
costs of commuting will pay more for land. Thus, assuming a firm maximizes profits, the
firm will be indifferent to their location along their given bid rent curve.
Applying this theory to the office market, and more specifically to office cost, if the cost
of the inputs is constant across all building types, then the variation in the supply would
be evidenced by merely the physical characteristics of a structure - or rather - the size of
an individual structure. Thus, the cost per square foot would be equal for all buildings in
the market. As we shall see in the hedonic cost model though, the quality of a building,
as measured by its attributes, varies across building characteristics as a result of cost
elasticity. As such, like Alonso's bid/rent curves, this thesis advances the theory that
under an efficient market where normal profits are returned to the land, there exist a
series of quality/cost curves which, in light of high vacancy levels and low rents relative
to replacement cost, reconciles continued increases in supply in response to dynamic
obsolescence, and rent differentials. Let us turn to the data to see if we can confirm such
a hypotheses.
5 If a particular product experienced higher than normal, or abnormal profits, and there were
minimal barriers to entry, firms would enter the market and bid prices down to a point where excess profits
no longer existed.
Chapter Three
PRESENTATION OF THE DATA
The principal data for the study comes from F.W. Dodge's database for office
construction for categories coded, 7, 305, 306, 405 and 406 for sixteen Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSA's). These categories include offices, banks and financial
buildings segregated into two categories of one to three story offices and four or more
story offices.
The MSA's were selected for their diversity as a sample of the population of buildings
nationwide. Mature cities like Chicago, New York, and Boston are included in the study
as are new "higher" growth cities, like Dallas and Atlanta. Washington D.C. is included
because of its "stable" demand for office space by users outside the traditional FIRE
sector. Charlotte and Raleigh are included as "emerging" cities, while San Jose is
included for its emergence over the last decade due to the explosion of Silicon Valley.
Aurora, Peoria and Gary are included to represent cities which presumably have a lower
percentage of its workforce within the FIRE category. These cities also represent older,
smaller cities. San Francisco and Oakland are included as representation for the West
Coast as well as this regions role as a "financial" center. The data contains over 44,000
6 While some may debate the stability of Washington D.C., office demand theorists contend the
large presence of "office-users" outside the traditional Fire, Insurance and Real Estate SIC sectors act to
stabilize the office market. Presumably, the large number of service-sector employees provide "stability"
to the occupancy level. Thus, is the growth of office space more or less stable than the other markets
tested.
records of either new construction or additions as reported by architects, engineers,
owners and contractors dating to 1967.7
This study will address only those records which comprise "new" office construction. In
1993 dollars, the cost of this space represented 123 billion dollars spent on office
construction. This data is also recorded on a county level basis. As reported by other
researchers, county level data will provide useful information when addressing the supply
response to metropolitan vacancy since metropolitan data often includes county wide
statistics.
From this database, information on reported values of construction for both new
construction and construction additions were tabulated by year.9 The trends and the cost
were estimated through regression analysis of the "value" data against time and building
attributes.
Addressing the building attributes, the raw data included information on square footage in
thousands of square feet, building height by stories, structural frame type and of course,
total reported value of construction. The data was categorized by year, MSA, builder
type and planner type (either architect, engineer, or contractor). Since this study is
7 The appendix includes summary statistics of the data by MSA.
8 As will be addressed shortly, this by no means constitutes the total amount spent on office
construction. For "shell" construction, the amounts recorded would represent perhaps 60%-80% of the
total cost of construction.
9 The F.W. Dodge database lists each record by month of report. For this study, though, the 12
months were summed and the corresponding values were recorded as if the reported values with respect to
supply occurred in the last quarter of the year.
concerned with the hedonic cost per square foot across time, the builder type and planner
type were omitted from the analysis. Once the data was categorized into individual cases
by year and MSA, it was further refined. Those cases which indicated a "zero-number"
for value, story height or square footage were removed from the dataset.' 0
Addressing the frame category, the data was segregated into one of twelve code types as
shown in tables one and two below:
10 These deletions accounted for only a nominal amount of observations.
Table 1 - Frame Code Definitions
Code Framing Type
A Load Bearing
C Wo
D Reinforced Concrete
E Prefabricated or Pre-Engineered
F Others not known or Classified
G Unknown
H Steel and Concrete
ILoad Bearing and Steel
J Load Bearing and Wood
K Load Bearing and Concrete
L Jnsind
FW Dodge Frame Type Classifications
The predominant frame types consisted of steel and load bearing structures. These two
frame types accounted for between 70% and roughly 83% of all frame types with the
exception of San Francisco, San Jose and Oakland. For these three cities, the categories
of "wood" and "unknown" accounted for a large percentage of the cases. In fact, across
all of the cities, the categories of wood and unknown accounted for the third and fourth
largest categories. In order to maintain consistency and achieve greater explanatory
power for the index, categories "A", load bearing and "B", steel, were used in the study.
Along with the other segmentation as previously noted, this reduced the dataset to just
over 25,000 cases.
Table 2 - Frame Type Cumulative %
MSA ZAB 11A,B,C |A,BC,D ABCI
Aurora 80.8% 83.8% 85.3% 88.3%
Atlanta 70.5% 82.9% 90.5% 92.7%
Boston 71.3% 82.6% 8.9% 86.0%
Charlotte 79.7% 88.2% 91.0% 92.1%
Chicago 82.8% 84.1% 8 /.9 90.0%
Dallas 78.9% 83.2% .8% 90.
Fort Worth 77.8% 87.1% 89.7% 90.8%
Gary, IN 69.8% 8'7.0% 8.6% 88.8
Joliet, IL 74.2% 81.9o 8TW 86.
New York City 79.1% 80.7% 83.9% 86.3%
Northern New Jersey 78.9% 85.0% 86.4o 87.7%
Oakland 45.8% 69.6% 71.9% 72.
Raleigh-Durham 73.6% 84.6% 87.9% 90.0%
San Francisco 39.5% 59.1% 62.6% 62.8%
San Jose 48.16 70.5% 3.0% 73.
Washington DC 70.0% 3.9% 88.0% 90.1%
Average 70.0% 80.3% 84.0% 533%
Standard Deviation 13.0% 7.7% 7.7% 8.2%
GENERAL TRENDS IN OFFICE SUPPLY
Reviewing the raw data presents some general trends across the MSA's with respect to
the level of office supply since 1967. The periods shown in the following tables
correspond well across the MSA's with the natural vacancy patterns reported by Voith &
Crone (1988). The period from 1967-1974 is characterized by an upward trend in the
supply and lag the demand peaks reported by approximately one year. However, the
construction boom from 1970 to 1973, fueled by increased investment capital from real
estate investment trusts, was more than adequate to meet the expected demand and as a
result, vacancy rates climbed to a peak in 1974. Generally, the data reveals a decline in
the level of new supply in 1974 over the previous period.
While the second period noted in the table (1975-1981) is characterized by a downward
trend, the nation still produced nearly the same amount (90%) of office space as was
constructed in the previous seven years. During this period, the "natural" vacancy rate
reported declined to roughly 6% in 1979 in response to increased demand after 1976.
During the period, the supply responded strongly in 1977 to 1979, but tapered off towards
the end of this cycle.
With tax law changes and an abundant supply of capital along with rises in real rents, the
supply trend again turned positive in 1982, again, a one year lag. 1 This period, as has
" It should be noted, FW Dodge records the value of new construction at the beginning of the
construction phase or shortly after the work has been "bid". Thus, the actual supply does not "come on the
market" until six to eighteen months after the reporting date. For further research into project duration,
please see the bibliography for OSHA's report on the "Estimation of Project Duration."
Table 3: Cost of New Square Footage
Millions of 1984 Dollars
MSA 1967-74 1975-81 1982-89 1990-93 lotal
Atlanta ,43T65.'/ 1,129.9 . 21. 62'.2
Aurora 6. /8.3 93. 47.2
Boston 2,300. 1,044.6 2,T69. 1. 6
Charlotte 450.8 262.6 983.1 1T.T 1,814.4
Chicago 4,2. 2,06 458. 707.0 222T
Dallas T -T T = 2773 T TGTF -- 3T TT7TT
Fort Worth 318 495.8 63.6 6. 1,T6
Gary, IN --- = 2T --- T --- TTT
Joliet, IL. 30.2 51.8 28.9 23.4 134.3
New Jersey 894.3 1 331.1 275.1 3,T3.
N-ew York City -2-T T -T= 3-T7TU -2
Oakland 6 601.'/ -222_ 2924
Raleigh-Durham 266.7 236.2 82.2 119.2 1,474.4
San Francisco -1M3.9 1,699.1 1,/792.0 14'/ 5,452.6
San Jose 28 667. 234. 206 2,536.9
Washington-D.C.T ~23~ 8~832 ~~~~T23~ O
Total -243- -84T 3732-3- -3 ~ -3-T2T
Table 4: Amount of New Square Footage
1000's of Square feet
MSA 1967-74 1975-81 1982-89 1990-93 Total
Atlanta 31622 23836.4 68198 7344 TT3.
Aurora 98.7 1307.4 - 681 111 582
Boston 29. 16993.8 483. 201 99.
Charlotte 884T7.8 712.7 T772 27i
Chicago 5J46.41 47437.2 79400.4 13704.5 194188.5
Dallas 267 58.51 /4I 8/4.1 /T57 /.6--//2T77 .3
Fort Worth 6262.8 962.1 3363. 164 3036'/.
Gary, IN 1634.8 243. 12/. 692 33/.1
Joliet, IL. - 792.3 583.2 428.- 278~2
New Jersey 14 14426.3 222. 3 . -- 3324.
New York City /650. 2-8'/ 338.*fl T 6 T9. 14
Oakland 9650 10149.6 398 3/6. 6
Raleigh-Durham 5042.t 4218.4 1OT0.2 2245. 2851 /.
San Francisco '---952 23149.4 25961. 2315 773
San Jose 8005.2 11640.3 21rY7. 4T/ 450/72.
Washington D.C. ---- = 372 -T43TJT - -T5W -- 3
Total 3'/4 309231 64724 /3879 133
Table 5: Number of New Buildings
Period
MSA 1967-74 1975-81 1982-89 1990-93 Total
Atlanta 19 '/62 192 379 41V3
Aurora /4 105 8
Boston 6 b l 150 183 244t
Charlotte 403 8 63 252 T70
Chicago 1210 1244 1287 1411 5152
Dallas 5 23 23 114
Fort Worth F - -- '7
Gary, IN 18 25/ 11 134 /17
Joliet, IL. 5/ 84 55 44 24
New Jersey 539 385 -- 56/ 8 / l/
New York City 64 262 3'/= l'/8 1660
Oakland 306 26 7/3 232 2037
Raleigh-Durham 259 263 6 1'/ 32
San Francisco 467 394 460 88 T49
San Jose 420 461 870 7 1928
Washington D.C. /48 93 198 3/ 3
Total 88 835 18 432 -3574
S.F./Building- 1000's 4 . 7 .1 4 l'. 38.
Source: ' W D~odge
been well reported, produced an unfettered supply of capital and resulted in a tremendous
amount of supply placed on the market. During the period of 1982-1989, the amount of
square footage constructed, as reported in the Dodge data, equaled the amount built in the
previous fourteen years. However, in 1984 dollars, the amount spent per square
decreased. This is not to suggest, though that productivity increased. The wide spread
amount of speculative construction suggests "shell" buildings without tenant finish-out
improvements were constructed. So, not only were we building more raw square footage,
we weren't necessarily completing as much either in a relative sense.
Additionally, in terms of averages, some interesting events occurred. In Chicago, for
instance, almost the exact number of buildings were constructed from 1975-1981 as were
constructed from 1982-89, however, the square footage per structure doubled over the
two time periods. For contrast, Dallas nearly doubled the amount of buildings
constructed, but reduced the amount of space constructed per building by 25%. Did these
changes occur because of land value fluctuations and the fact that an acre of land in
Dallas cost less than a similar acre in Chicago, thus in order for there to be any residual to
the land, or profit to the developer, a building in Chicago had to capture greater "total
rents"? Or since buildings built in Chicago presumably cost more to build than those in
Dallas, developers had to build more for the same reasons cited above? As many real
estate professionals will agree, while we would like to believe urban economics played a
role in determining the quantity of supply constructed, the supply of capital surely played
a greater role.
Still, as is so evident in the housing market where the cost of constructing a home is
relatively inelastic and the supply responds quickly to changes in price, why doesn't such
a price clearing mechanism exist in the office market supply cycle? Does the cost of
construction not increase as developers demand new buildings. Are the factors of input,
namely wages and materials, relatively elastic allowing an unfettered supply of space in
response to the capital markets? In order to answer these questions, we need to determine
in a straight forward manner, the cost required to construct an average office building to
lend a greater understanding of office market supply characteristics. The following
chapter outlines such a model and provides encouraging results for determining a time
series cost structure.
Chapter Four
METHODOLOGY OF THE OFFICE REPLACEMENT COST INDEX
The basis for the model for a construction cost index will be patterned after models
developed by various researchers of house prices as well as a model recently presented by
Torto/Wheaton (1992) in their analysis of office rent indices. Court (1939) and Griliches
(1971) pioneered hedonic price analysis in which the independent components of a
heterogeneous good are determined through regression analysis. Whereas the rent and
house price index models seek to find the most probable market price, this index will
address the most probable market cost.
Like the hedonic rent and price indices, the replacement cost index will value the cost per
square foot in current cost/nominal dollars through the hedonic equation and thus create a
cost index with current cost terms. A methodological issue arises because of the variation
in both the general price level and changes in building quality over time and whether the
index captures changes in cost for quality over time.
Of the latter, buildings constructed later are subject to greater regulatory requirements.
Cost increases can be experienced for a variety of reasons. As a possible move towards
attracting tenants and reducing life-cycle costs, "smart" buildings have been developed
which increased the cost of security systems as well as control systems for heating and
electrical purposes, to name just a few of the advancements. One may also hypothesize
12 Norman G. Miller, "Residential Property Hedonic Pricing Models: A Review,"
Research in Real Estate (Volume 2, 1982), pp. 31-56
that reduced capitalization rates in the 80's also contributed to a higher "class" of
building with a greater amount of funds expended for architectural finishes and vertical
transportation. The assumption considered in this thesis is that given the current state of
the commercial real estate market and sustained levels of high vacancy, a developer of
commercial space will have to respond to the quality of structures existing in the market.
Assuming a sustained level of material and labor productivity for commercial building
products and construction, the real cost of construction will not disinflate. This argument
can be expanded to say emerging telecommunication technology, regulatory requirements
like the American Disabilities Act, and clean-air reform (through the abolishment of
CFC's) will increase the real cost of construction over time in the absence of returns to
scale for labor and material production. However, the evidence suggested by the data
indicates the opposite holds true.
Considering the investors perspective, such technological advancements may reduce the
life-cycle cost of the building as noted above. Thus, the investor may be willing to lower
his/her capitalization rate and pay "more" for the asset in return for higher cash flows as a
result of reduced operating costs. Such actions would induce continual quality
improvements in building technologies.
Another methodological issue arises when considering development and site acquisition
costs as well as short-term interest rates. If one is to employ the hedonic construction
cost index to assess supply conditions in the marketplace, a model should be developed
which captures land rent. Theoretically, the residual between a capitalized rent index and
a cost index less development and site acquisition costs should represent the potential
profit to the land. By combining the two models, an effective method for determining
highest and best use land value emerges.
However, while the cost model captures the qualitative costs of an office building over
time relative to the height, area and frame, it does include all the costs associated with
development. The costs not included are engineering and design fees, site preparation,
demolition, change orders and any lease inducements for capital improvements.
Estimates for this additional work range from 20% to 40%. Still, if these extra costs are
proportional to the "shell" costs of a structure, the movements and changes of the
replacement index would hold because of the relative nature of the index.
The last methodological issue to be raised is the population of observations. The data set
includes offices from the one to three story category as well as the four and above
category as provided by FW Dodge. While this index captures changes over time for the
reported population of buildings in the office category, a subset of indices can be
developed which addresses categories of building types with more narrowly defined
attributes.
PRESENTATION OF THE HEDONIC COST MODEL
A log linear model was selected over a multiplicative production function for the simple
reason that the research is not attempting to determine probable cost through productive
inputs. Rather, the research attempts to determine cost for the hypothesized relationship
through qualitative explanatory variables. As such, an index is developed which
calculates cost over time for an average building. The results of the equation estimate the
average cost over time for buildings with different qualitative characteristics. The
approach uses the natural log of current cost (nominal dollar)13 per square foot by simply
dividing the reported value in the data by the reported amount of square footage.
By using a natural log form, each term in the equation has a constant percentage impact
upon cost rather than a current cost/nominal dollar impact. For example, if the coefficient
for STORY were .022, an increase of one story for a building would represent an increase
in cost per square foot of approximately 2.2%, while a ten story building would increase
the cost approximately 25%.14 Dummy variables were created for the year of the
reported project. The dummy variables shift the equation multiplicatively. For instance,
if the value of the coefficient for 1982 in a given city is 1.033, then the cost for any
building in this market will be 103.3% higher than the default year (say, 1967). The
equation used for the analysis was of the following form:
13 Not adjusted for changes in general purchasing power
1 The actual impact upon cost will be: e raised to .022 times 10, or 1.246
Ln (COSTSF)= c o + a 1 STORY +C 2FRAME + U 3AREA
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where:
COSTSF = Reported value / reported square feet
STORY = Number of stories15
FRAME = (= 1 if steel, = 0 if load bearing)
AREA = Square feet in 1000's of square feet
Di = Dummy variable for each year (1967 default; i = 1968, 1993)
X, p = estimated statistical parameters
From the equation, an average cost index was calculated based on an office building of
varying types of quality characteristics. As would be expected, when indexed to 1982,
the index remained constant for any average building type constructed in a given MSA.
An average cost index was then calculated based upon a modified mean of the building
types for each MSA for use in constructing a model of the level of supply which will be
addressed shortly.
REPLACEMENT COST INDEX: ANALYSIS & COST ELASTICITY
The results of the tests are reported in tables six through nine. The test results are
encouraging and indicate striking similarities across metropolitan areas. The index also
confirms various hypothesis regarding returns to scale relative to quality characteristics
for those markets which had a large population with an assumed normal distribution.
" In certain MSA's, stories 1-3 were assigned the value "0" and the balance of the observations
were treated as continuous variables. This increased the explanatory power of the model.
Smaller markets with a lower-tail skewed distribution showed some interesting contrasts
as well.
Table 6 - Hedonic Commercial Office Cost Index Coefficients
Variable I Atlanta,GA Aurora, IL Boston, MA Charlotte,NC
Beta t-stat Beta t-stat Beta t-stat Beta t-stat
Constant 2.7580 60.5880 2.6284 16.9840 3.0105 70.8080 2.5210 35.9010
Story 0.0225 4.8160 -0.0710 -2.0750 0.0224 6.9340 0.0404 2.3580
Frame -0.0429 -2.9740 0.1382 2.5840 -0.0705 -4.1160 0.0125 0.4710
Area -0.0010 -5.0450 -0.0006 -0.8010 -0.0004 -2.9000 -0.0002 -0.4330
Dummy 1968 -0.0254 -0.4180 0.1712 0.6210 -0.0262 -0.4610 0.1665 1.9560
Dummy 1969 -0.0516 -0.7650 0.4381 2.1510 -0.0182 -0.3160 0.1839 2.1350
Dummy 1970 0.0807 1.3590 0.7096 3.7210 0.1226 2.0810 0.3215 3.5830
Dummy 1971 0.1477 2.6810 0.5431 2.5960 0.1235 1.9620 0.4623 5.0070
Dummy 1972 0.2033 3.7360 0.5416 3.0160 0.2631 4.2780 0.3393 4.0510
Dummy 1973 0.2973 5.6210 0.8082 4.0800 0.3087 5.2540 0.5698 6.1590
Dummy 1974 0.4829 8.9330 0.7460 4.1100 0.3970 6.8120 0.5734 5.8630
Dummy 1975 0.4653 6.3050 0.9124 4.5970 0.5525 9.6170 0.7925 8.0010
Dummy 1976 0.6332 8.4360 1.0429 6.0600 0.5181 8.3530 0.7873 9.0020
Dummy 1977 0.7259 11.1690 0.9314 5.4950 0.7069 12.4550 0.9917 10.8880
Dummy 1978 0.8436 14.5010 0.8678 5.2340 0.5629 8.9390 1.0833 12.6140
Dummy 1979 0.8436 14.9340 1.0560 6.2330 0.7580 12.3270 1.1617 13.6640
Dummy 1980 0.9824 17.3150 1.4695 7.9900 0.8204 13.6740 1.2274 14.5550
Dummy 1981 0.9562 17.8640 1.5813 5.6810 0.9172 14.7890 1.1988 14.4640
Dummy 1982 1.0333 18.8340 1.2324 4.4460 0.9150 15.3310 1.2517 13.7370
Dummy 1983 1.0970 20.5880 1.5106 8.0240 0.9943 18.4790 1.2599 15.0470
Dummy 1984 1.1352 22.5010 1.5710 8.5500 1.0976 20.8140 1.3176 15.3210
Dummy 1985 1.0948 21.9510 1.3903 7.1810 1.0914 21.6300 1.3922 18.0750
Dummy 1986 1.1493 22.3290 1.4717 7.8650 1.1664 22.0340 1.3738 17.4620
Dummy 1987 1.2620 23.6690 1.5684 8.5750 1.2787 24.2530 1.4813 18.2080
Dummy 1988 1.2612 23.2980 1.5866 8.9450 1.2370 23.7380 1.5165 18.6270
Dummy 1989 1.4417 26.6390 1.8201 10.4210 1.3794 23.9200 1.6162 19.5730
Dummy 1990 1.5586 23.7890 1.7199 9.5590 1.4686 20.2260 1.6041 17.6270
Dummy 1991 1.5259 27.9390 1.7938 8.8190 1.5005 22.5800 1.7624 21.1750
Dummy 1992 1.4244 21.6320 1.6761 7.9680 1.3989 19.6120 1.6660 19.3730
Dummy 1993 1.3584 18.3040 1.7021 9.0100 1.3508 22.2600 1.7374 20.1050
R^2 0.6516 0.6828 0.6887 0.6647
Observations 2834 252 1744 1352
Story Mean 1.66 1.50 2.58 1.42
Story Std. Dev. 2.61 0.82 3.93 1.60
95% C.Int. 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.08
Area Mean 20.09 15.75 42.43 14.30
Area Std. Dev. 68.18 37.32 113.52 43.61
95% C.Int. 2.51 4.61 5.33 2.32
Bold figures indicate coefficients significant at the 99.99% level.
Italicized figures indicate coefficients not significant at the 95% level. All others are significant.
Table 7 - Hedonic Commercial Office Cost Index Coefficients
Variable Chicago, IL Dallas, TX Fort Worth, TX Gary, IN
Beta t-stat Beta t-stat Beta t-stat Beta t-stat
Constant 2.9648 102.315 2.6230 54.8830 2.7434 26.8210 2.8742 23.5980
Story 0.0158 6.8250 0.0092 3.0000 0.0211 3.1260 -0.0261 -0.8530
Frame -0.0265 -2.2370 -0.0222 -2.2030 0.0205 1.1830 0.0873 1.6810
Area -0.0003 -4.8480 -0.0002 -2.2970 -0.0008 -3.0350 0.0004 0.3650
Dummy 1968 nic 0.0665 1.1420 0.0762 0.5630 0.1935 1.3300
Dummy 1969 0.0066 0.1650 0.1788 2.9580 -0.0929 -0.8020 0.1277 0.8910
Dummy 1970 0.1113 2.5690 0.1961 3.5060 0.1963 1.7080 0.1663 1.0900
Dummy 1971 0.1815 4.4640 0.2248 4.1580 0.2476 2.2510 0.3589 2.2430
Dummy 1972 0.2222 5.6300 0.3777 7.0870 0.2613 2.4010 0.3979 2.6180
Dummy 1973 0.2955 7.5280 0.4525 8.6110 0.2944 2.7080 0.4347 2.8430
Dummy 1974 0.3996 10.0780 0.5741 10.9320 0.4693 4.3430 0.3405 2.5640
Dummy 1975 0.3820 9.0860 0.6274 11.2250 0.4564 4.1160 0.4021 2.9860
Dummy 1976 0.3928 9.6900 0.6095 11.4520 0.4486 4.1580 0.5084 3.7190
Dummy 1977 0.5338 14.8720 0.6599 12.5440 0.5819 5.3730 0.5920 4.3080
Dummy 1978 0.5818 15.8050 0.8695 16.5950 0.6350 5.8820 0.6078 4.5930
Dummy 1979 0.7705 21.0380 0.9863 19.1010 0.8502 7.7750 0.7134 5.0540
Dummy 1980 0.8902 23.8820 1.1117 21.3440 0.9444 8.7900 0.9966 6.1980
Dummy 1981 0.8952 22.6690 1.1314 22.1640 1.0517 9.5870 1.3296 7.7970
Dummy 1982 0.9840 21.9260 1.2766 24.5410 1.0840 9.9300 1.1607 7.5040
Dummy 1983 1.0290 24.5310 1.3576 27.0210 1.2614 11.9470 1.2106 7.5660
Dummy 1984 1.0093 26.6070 1.4036 28.3020 1.2992 12.3270 1.0526 6.9250
Dummy 1985 1.0233 26.9540 1.4048 28.5820 1.2712 12.0070 1.0781 6.8920
Dummy 1986 1.0562 27.9060 1.4203 28.3010 1.2890 12.2990 1.0675 5.9900
Dummy 1987 1.2156 31.4750 1.3816 27.1610 1.2568 11.8550 1.3961 7.2490
Dummy 1988 1.2048 31.9220 1.3749 27.0200 1.2891 11.9770 1.4428 8.6600
Dummy 1989 1.3054 34.7410 1.5231 28.7370 1.3867 12.6900 1.4247 8.9920
Dummy 1990 1.4358 38.6980 1.5033 29.3580 1.3886 13.1760 1.4865 9.8550
Dummy 1991 1.3429 41.3750 1.7380 32.4630 1.6757 14.8480 1.5156 11.1430
Dummy 1992 1.3377 40.2350 1.8566 30.3590 1.7158 12.4100 1.4846 10.7770
Dummy 1993 1.4789 45.7650 1.8471 28.2740 1.6412 13.3690 1.6260 11.7830
RA2 0.7098 0.7437 0.7225 0.6564
Observations 4208 3999 1535 503
Story Mean 1.90 1.53 1.32 1.23
Story Std. Dev. 3.91 2.82 1.49 0.71
95% C.Int. 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.06
Area Mean 28.47 20.06 11.66 7.19
Area Std. Dev. 134.37 85.01 45.15 19.40
95% C.Int. 4.06 2.63 2.26 1.70
Bold figures indicate coefficients significant at the 99.99% level.
Italicized figures indicate coefficients not significant at the 95% level. All others are significant.
Table 8 - Hedonic Commercial Office Cost Index Coefficients
Variable Joliet, IL New Jersey New York Oakland, CA
Beta t-stat Beta t-stat Beta t-stat Beta t-stat
Constant 2.5941 7.1200 2.9812 63.5960 2.9880 77.2410 2.9458 33.3490
Story -0.0345 -0.5110 0.0182 3.0840 0.0142 8.2000 0.0351 6.1550
Frame -0.0255 -0.3480 -0.0857 -4.0620 -0.0004 -0.0180 0.0822 2.5940
Area -0.0008 -0.3570 -0.0003 -2.0300 -0.0001 -1.0490 -0.0010 -7.4410
Dummy 1968 0.6609 1.7470 0.1096 1.8150 0.0242 0.4580 No Obs. No Obs.
Dummy 1969 No Obs. No Obs. 0.0770 1.2620 0.1210 2.0640 Default Default
Dummy 1970 0.7085 1.7900 0.2784 4.3310 0.2080 3.7930 0.1188 0.8400
Dummy 1971 0.7302 1.8520 0.4505 6.4870 0.3521 5.9100 0.1652 1.3530
Dummy 1972 0.8329 2.1750 0.2865 4.0970 0.3336 5.3380 0.2166 1.7340
Dummy 1973 0.7576 1.8970 0.5917 7.4550 0.4986 8.0810 0.1090 0.9630
Dummy 1974 0.8726 2.3290 0.4463 6.5020 0.6132 10.0000 0.3548 3.0914
Dummy 1975 0.8156 2.2000 0.6111 9.6610 0.5694 8.1610 0.5224 3.8380
Dummy 1976 0.9053 2.4010 0.6750 9.1370 0.5797 7.8520 0.5512 4.1820
Dummy 1977 0.9012 2.4070 0.6252 8.7350 0.7115 8.0020 0.6620 5.2660
Dummy 1978 1.0865 2.8920 0.6988 9.9570 0.6470 9.4710 0.5169 4.5000
Dummy 1979 0.9467 2.2930 0.8006 12.2150 0.8231 11.8030 0.8322 6.3240
Dummy 1980 1.3645 3.6140 0.8381 12.9970 0.9236 12.1670 0.9309 8.4300
Dummy 1981 1.4515 3.6290 1.0393 13.6530 1.0023 11.9250 0.9641 9.0550
Dummy 1982 1.2862 3.1980 1.0832 15.6740 1.0853 14.4970 1.0266 9.5650
Dummy 1983 1.7434 4.2480 1.2507 18.0760 1.1332 16.5510 1.0436 10.6550
Dummy 1984 1.2075 2.9100 1.2811 19.8380 1.2607 20.4250 1.1782 12.2840
Dummy 1985 1.2408 3.0780 1.3311 21.9260 1.1903 20.6940 1.0710 11.1940
Dummy 1986 1.4377 3.6610 1.2217 19.7390 1.2572 23.1610 1.1615 12.2360
Dummy 1987 1.6850 4.3840 1.3155 19.1000 1.2790 25.1230 1.1500 11.7610
Dummy 1988 1.6506 4.3870 1.3714 21.6250 1.3520 23.8180 1.1739 11.9670
Dummy 1989 2.0923 4.1260 1.4317 21.4610 1.3172 21.9990 1.1593 11.9720
Dummy 1990 1.8238 4.8880 1.4083 18.0910 1.4433 25.8170 1.3181 13.6590
Dummy 1991 2.0845 4.7070 1.4483 16.1820 1.4672 20.3470 1.3635 13.8890
Dummy 1992 1.9259 5.0820 1.5196 14.7420 1.6040 20.2230 1.3788 14.1530
Dummy 1993 1.7338 4.4210 1.3004 10.0460 1.4649 19.2730 1.5544 14.9360
RA2 0.6442 0.6724 0.7089 0.6031
Observations 172 1258 1325 788
Story Mean 1.32 2.14 4.85 2.01
Story Std. Dev. 0.63 2.05 9.51 2.63
95% C.Int. 0.09 0.11 0.51 0.18
Area Mean 9.45 37.23 94.75 40.40
Area Std. Dev. 15.73 83.15 290.64 104.24
95% C.Int. 2.34 4.60 15.65 7.28
Bold figures indicate coefficients significant at the 99.99% level.
Italicized figures indicate coefficients not significant at the 95% level. All others are significant.
Table 9 - Hedonic Commercial Office Cost Index Coefficients
Variable Raleigh, NC San Francisco I San Jose, CA I Washington DC
Beta t-stat Beta t-stat Beta t-stat Beta t-stat
Constant 2.7513 32.9230 2.9964 25.4470 2.7563 18.8930 2.9260 75.2030
Story 0.0270 2.8430 0.0234 7.6630 0.0186 2.9410 0.0126 4.2700
Frame -0.0248 -0.9680 0.0214 0.7150 0.0166 0.4830 -0.0739 -5.4380
Area -0.0018 -4.1520 -0.0006 -4.4770 -0.0010 -4.7420 -0.0004 -4.5240
Dummy 1968 0.1246 1.1520 No Obs. No Obs. No Obs. No Obs. -0.0485 -0.9150
Dummy 1969 0.1597 1.4620 Default Default Default Default 0.0793 1.3470
Dummy 1970 0.2654 2.5310 0.0954 0.6720 0.4996 2.8500 0.1871 3.2190
Dummy 1971 0.3009 2.4130 0.1680 1.1770 0.5423 3.2510 0.2425 4.3380
Dummy 1972 0.3022 2.9540 0.2866 2.0670 0.4884 3.0270 0.2451 4.4110
Dummy 1973 0.5495 5.5080 0.1732 1.0790 0.5218 3.2360 0.3015 5.5060
Dummy 1974 0.5739 4.8560 0.3710 2.6010 0.5827 3.2590 0.6224 10.5090
Dummy 1975 0.6214 5.1800 0.3826 2.5950 0.7200 4.3490 0.6703 10.5110
Dummy 1976 0.7445 5.8550 0.6508 4.4990 0.7723 4.6290 0.6191 9.5690
Dummy 1977 0.8649 7.8430 0.4745 2.9580 0.8305 5.1470 0.6943 12.3670
Dummy 1978 0.8304 7.9070 0.4500 3.2550 0.7751 4.6010 0.7406 15.0980
Dummy 1979 0.9810 9.4730 0.8005 6.1500 1.1314 6.7580 0.8249 17.3450
Dummy 1980 1.0447 10.2570 0.8649 6.5370 1.1923 7.1980 0.9219 19.1490
Dummy 1981 1.0695 10.6060 1.0442 8.0650 1.2420 7.5590 1.1011 21.5950
Dummy 1982 1.1379 11.1680 1.1620 9.1110 1.3518 8.3970 1.0526 21.2200
Dummy 1983 1.2521 13.0840 1.1402 8.7920 1.3843 9.1040 1.0951 23.4310
Dummy 1984 1.2689 13.9060 1.1196 8.9010 1.4340 9.4920 1.1153 25.1600
Dummy 1985 1.2221 13.1700 1.2147 9.6820 1.2871 8.4880 1.1633 26.2070
Dummy 1986 1.3052 13.7260 1.1620 9.3040 1.4259 9.4830 1.2118 27.4850
Dummy 1987 1.3742 14.2780 1.1240 8.8680 1.3457 9.0630 1.2892 28.7800
Dummy 1988 1.3631 14.3240 1.1574 9.3280 1.3779 9.2650 1.2731 27.6600
Dummy 1989 1.5279 15.9280 1.2465 9.7100 1.4191 9.5620 1.3679 28.5720
Dummy 1990 1.5763 14.8680 1.3373 10.5990 1.4939 9.9340 1.3767 28.7830
Dummy 1991 1.5661 15.2740 1.3393 9.4310 1.5597 9.9520 1.4871 25.3380
Dummy 1992 1.4934 14.8720 1.4842 11.0590 1.6256 10.4320 1.3898 20.4920
Dummy 1993 1.6238 15.9320 1.3898 8.9620 1.5843 9.9790 1.4812 22.2580
RA2 0.6332 0.6786 0.5182 0.6275
Observations 962 529 890 2744
Story Mean 1.67 4.50 1.68 2.50
Story Std. Dev. 1.48 7.51 1.88 2.27
95% C.Int. 0.09 0.64 0.12 0.08
Area Mean 19.40 75.60 26.20 41.35
Area Std. Dev. 38.59 165.47 64.36 93.20
95% C.Int. 2.44 14.10 4.23 3.49
Bold figures indicate coefficients significant at the 99.99% level.
Italicized figures indicate coefficients not significant at the 95% level. All others are significant.
Considering the first coefficient of interest, STORY was significant with respect to cost
in all but two markets namely, Gary, Indiana and Peoria, Illinois. Furthermore, except for
these two markets as well as Aurora, Illinois, the signs for the coefficients were positive.
The positive sign indicates a percentage premium in cost for each additional story
constructed on a building. Thus, the commonly held notion that it is more expensive to
build a taller building then a shorter building with an equally sized floor plate was not
violated in the larger markets. For the smaller markets, the preponderance of lower
buildings with a concrete frame may have been more expensive on a per square foot basis
than taller structures with a steel frame. Further segmenting of this market is required,
though to confirm such a hypothesis.
Interestingly, cities like San Francisco and Oakland commanded a larger premium for
taller buildings, ranging from 2.35% to 3.5%, versus either New York (1.4%) or Chicago
(1.58%). One of a couple of reasons may account for this variation. First, due to seismic
requirements, buildings on the west coast require addition structural bracing and therefore
require a premium to construct taller buildings. Secondly, the preponderance of the
frame type used, which will be explored shortly, as well as the "narrow distribution" of
the STORY mean may also explain the variation in STORY,.
Charlotte and Raleigh-Durham also incurred large premiums for tall buildings at 4% and
2.7% respectively. This may be accounted for by the large subset of structures in the 1-3
story category. In Raleigh, this category of one to three story structures accounted for
86% of the Dodge records whereas in Charlotte, this category accounted for 92%. In
other cities, like Chicago or New York, this category of story height accounted for 71%
and 72.6%, respectively. Fewer, taller and more expensive buildings on a per square foot
basis relative to the smaller structures, may tend to exaggerate the premium for the story
height if the observations were not normally distributed.
Addressing the coefficients for FRAME, this attribute may shed some light on the
premiums afforded to STORY in the various cities, as indicated above. In the case of
New York and Chicago, the sign for the coefficient was negative. Since a load bearing
frame was the default attribute, the negative sign indicates a discount for steel structures
in these markets. Whereas in San Francisco, San Jose and Oakland, the positive sign
indicates a premium for steel structures. Notably, in addition to New York and Chicago,
Atlanta, Boston, Joliet, New Jersey, Dallas, Raleigh and Washington offered discounts
for steel frames. The conclusion to be drawn from the sample is that it is more expensive
to build load bearing structures than steel frame structures in the MSA's noted above
while it is less expensive to build load bearing structural frame buildings versus steel
frame buildings in Aurora, Charlotte, Fort Worth, Gary and the west coast MSA's
included in the study.
There may be many reasons for these differentials. For instance, the construction
productivity of the workforce relative to the structure type may cause these premiums and
discounts. For example, since Peoria does not "frequently" build high-rises, they may
have to premium to secure the necessary resources when they decide to build one.
Another reason may exist because of building codes and material efficiencies. For
instance, "pound-for-pound" steel is a more efficient material for carrying loads.
However, certain building codes will specify greater or lesser amounts of structural
bearing capacity for a frame type. Thus, the differences in material composition and the
cost for transportation and installation (relative to "heavier" or "lighter" material
weights), will cost discriminate between frame types.
Not surprisingly, the mean story height for those MSA's which command a premium for
a steel buildings (like Fort Worth, Aurora and Gary), 2.27 as opposed to a story mean of
2.52 for those MSA's which offer a discount for steel' (cities like Chicago, New York
and Boston). Certainly, the propensity to use a given frame will depend upon the
building codes, the "natural design habitat" of a given market as well as the productivity
of the inputs.
The next coefficient of interest is AREA. In all cities, with the exception of Gary,
Indiana, the sign for the coefficient was negative. Even still, in Gary, the increased
square footage accounted for a premium of 0.04%. Given the default case in Gary for a
structure built in 1993, the increased cost per 1000 square feet would add about $0.04 at
the margin or a total of $40 for a 1000 square foot building. To put this in perspective,
16 When the high mean and low mean were omitted to compute a sample mean, the story mean of
those MSA's which offered a premium for a steel frame was 1.98, versus 2.33 for those MSA's which
offered a discount.
the total cost of a 1000 square foot one story concrete frame structure building located in
Gary would cost $87,750. The amount contributed to the total cost by the square foot
coefficient amounts to a nominal amount of $40.17
In the remainder of the cities, eleven of sixteen cities reported statistics significant at the
95% level for AREA. The negative sign reported indicates both a discount for larger
floor plates, that is, a larger amount of square feet per floor, as well as increasing returns
to scale from a cost elasticity viewpoint with respect to area. As will be addressed in a
moment, this does not mean the overall cost elasticity demonstrates increasing returns to
scale, though.
The range of the AREA coefficients accounted for a low discount of 0.01% in New York
for each additional 1000 square feet, to a high discount in Raleigh-Durham of 0.18%.
Ten of the sample MSA's reported discounts in the range of 0.02% to 0.08% for every
1000 square feet built. Thus, in contrast to Gary, each 0.01% value of the beta parameter
decreases the total cost of the 1000 square foot structure by roughly $10. Given the risk
of development and the risk of construction, the relatively small discount would not seem
to represent a great incentive to build larger buildings.
Still, the research confirms a widely held notion that building larger, flatter buildings
create increasing returns to scale versus taller, narrower buildings which create decreasing
17 However, this does represent a decreasing return to scale for the cost elasticity.
returns to scale. The relative magnitude between the various markets for the cost
elasticity varied, as shown in Table 10. The figures identified below combine the relative
effects of STORY and AREA to determine the cost elasticity for each MSA. Because of
relative multiplicative effects of the dummy variables for time and frame, the cost
elasticity hold regardless of the time period or frame type for an average type of building
with the specifications noted in the table.
Table 10 - Cost Elasticity: Vary By Height and Floor Plate
Floor Plate Area 15000 - 30-60000 Floor Plate Change
Change in Story 10 to 20 5 Story Height
Change in Total SF 150,000 150,000 Change in Total SF[- MSA Elasticity Rank Elasticity MSA
Charlotte 1.9245 16 0.7299 Atlanta
Oakland, CA 1.4410 15 0.5153 Gary, IN
Boston, MA 1.3709 14 0.4977 New York
San Francisco, CA 1.2944 13 0.4941 Charlotte
New York 1.2832 12 0.4912 Dallas
New Jersey 1.2771 11 0.4874 Chicago
Chicago 1.2269 10 0.4871 New Jersey
Fort Worth 1.2077 9 0.4867 Boston, MA
Atlanta 1.1655 8 0.4857 Washington DC
Washington DC 1.1418 7 0.4785 Aurora, IL
Dallas 1.1162 6 0.4760 San Francisco, CA
San Jose, CA 1.0634 5 0.4721 Fort Worth
Raleigh-Durham, NC 1.0066 4 0.4698 Joliet, IL
Gary, IN 0.6381 3 0.4625 Oakland, CA
Joliet, IL 0.2540 2 0.4618 San Jose, CA
Aurora, IL N.M. 1 0.4348 Raleigh-Durham, NC
> 1, indicates decreasing returns to scale
= 1, indicates constant returns to scale
< 1, indicates increasing returns to scale
The cost elasticity for each MSA was computed in the following manner. For the first
case (as shown on the left hand side of the table), the area specified was a 15,000 square
foot floor plate 10 stories tall indicating an area total of 150,000 square feet. The total
cost for this structure was then computed using the coefficients for STORY, AREA,
FRAME and the CONSTANT and the specifications as noted above. Another building
specification was valued through the coefficients this time increasing the STORY height
to 20 floors. The figures noted in the column below the specification thus indicate the
percentage change in total cost associated with a percentage change in output, or in this
case, square footage. In the case of Charlotte, a 100% increase in square footage
increased the total cost by roughly 192%. The conclusion to be drawn is that in
Charlotte, you can expect the cost of construction to increase at the margin for taller
buildings because the discount associated with AREA is less than the premium charged
for STORY.
With the exception of Gary, Joliet and Aurora, all the MSA's experienced decreasing
returns to scale. Caution should be noted, however, with respect to computing an
elasticity outside the relevant range of the data. As shown for Aurora, a negative sign
was incurred which was not meaningful. With cost elasticity, this is not realistic since
cost elasticity has a lower bound of zero. 19 In Aurora, the data indicates there wasn't a
structure built which exceeded six stories in height, over the time horizon analyzed.
18 Described as the percentage change in total cost divided by the percentage change in total
square footage, thus measuring the relative change in total cost over the range of the example.
19 Due to the discount from STORY, the calculation yielded a total cost for the 20 story structure
which was less than the 10 story structure. Cost elasticity has a lower bound of zero. Thus, the lower price
for the taller building violates the definition of a cost elasticity.
Since this building is outside the relevant range, the cost elasticity is suspect. In the
Washington D.C. MSA (which includes portions of Maryland and Virginia), there were
only six office buildings which exceeded 15 stories. Thus, extending the example outside
the range of the data to twenty stories, may cause one to question the validity of the cost
elasticity.
Nonetheless, the table does provide insight into the fact that across the balance of sample
cities for buildings of this average type and quality, office construction cost indicates
20decreasing returns to scale . The newer and "stable" cities, like Atlanta, Dallas, San Jose
and Washington, all exhibited a "better" return to scale than the more mature cities like
New York or Chicago. The example presented in column 1 of the table represents
doubling the height of the average building and focuses on STORY as an indicator of cost
elasticity. In column two, the analysis concentrates on holding the height constant and
increasing the AREA by 100%.
The change associated with doubling the AREA indicates increasing returns to scale
across the MSA's sampled. In the case of Atlanta, doubling the floor plate as well as the
total square footage increased the total cost by roughly 73%. In this instance, the
building specification is within the relevant range for the sample MSA's. Nearly all of
the observations hover within a few percentage points of 50%. Thus, by doubling the
20 Gary and Joliet are also outside the relevant range.
square footage of this average building type, one would experience a total cost of 150%
of the base condition, that is, a 5 story, 150,000 square foot building.
A series of scenarios were tested for two other types of building specifications. By
doubling the height and doubling the floor plate, thereby increasing the total square
footage by 400%, the range of cost elasticity was from 200% to 400%, demonstrating
decreasing returns to scale. When the floor plate was reduced by 50% and the height
increased by 100%, decreasing returns to scale were experienced in the range of 104% to
119%. Thus, despite the same square footage, the total cost increased. This highlights
the premium associated with increasing the story height. Thus, while these statistics
allow us to infer greater productivity for the specified building type for those cities with
"slower" decreasing returns to scale, greater research into a productive construction input
model may provide greater conclusive evidence.
Still, the results seem to suggest a propensity for certain building types to be built within
a given MSA (and perhaps, a propensity for certain types during a given time frame) and
answers some questions about the characteristics of supply of office space. While cost
elasticity does not necessarily inhibit the growth of stock in the market, the evidence
suggests that cost elasticity may act to inhibit or to restrain the physical volume and type
of individual buildings constructed when the flow of capital into the market is "low" and
cap rates are "high." This issue will be addressed further in the section which discusses
the elasticity of supply.
Addressing the goodness-of-fit, or "R-square", the hedonic model yields a fair amount of
consistency across all of the markets. With the exception of Oakland, the attributes in the
model explained anywhere from 63% (Washington DC) to 74.4% (Dallas) of the
variation in price and quality across the time period analyzed. New York, Chicago,
Dallas and Fort Worth all reported R-squares in excess of 70%. Changes in building
components across time, such as architectural finishes, vertical transportation,
environmental and telecommunication systems will likely have contributed some portion
to the explanatory power of the model. Still, the results are encouraging. Furthermore,
prior tests explored segmenting the STORY attribute and creating a dummy variable
instead of a continuous variable. The results experienced were not as superior though.
In those markets which experienced a high R-square, they also indicated a larger
confidence interval thus capturing "broader representation" in the model. In virtually all
of the markets for most of the periods, the coefficients for the YEAR dummy variables
were significant at the 99.99% level. This represents a strong time-series and suggests a
consistent level of cost per square foot for an average building type in any given year.
Reviewing some of the coefficients, a building built in 1993 in Boston cost roughly 385%
more than the average building constructed in 1967. Looking down the tables, various
increases and decreases were experienced in all the different markets within one to two
2 Buildings were segmented into two categories of story. For the dummy variable, "0"
represented office buildings of 1-3 stories, while "1" represented buildings 4 stories or higher. The tests
resulted in a goodness of fit one to four percent lower than the results reported herein.
22 " " raised to the power of 1.35 equals 3.857, or 386%.
years of one another. In markets like Chicago, Gary, Aurora, and Washington, prices
dropped from high levels in 1989 and 1990 to low levels in 1992 and increased last year.
This seems to follow the recession experienced in the earlier years followed by the
growth experienced over the last 18 months.
In Atlanta, San Francisco, San Jose, New York and New Jersey, prices dropped from
1992 to 1993. This may indicate that the recession hit these markets later than the
previously mentioned markets. Dallas has experienced a slight drop in costs from 1992
to 1993 after "riding" an upward curve from 1984 to 1986, then dropping in 1987 and
1988 and increasing ever since. During this period, Dallas experienced a large number of
corporate relocations such as JC Penny, GTE, and Exxon as well as expansions by EDS.
During this time frame, there were also a large number of relocations to the suburbs,
away from downtown which added to the increases in supply as well as the increase in
vacancy.
NOMINAL COST SERIES & FUNCTIONAL USES OF THE INDEX
Given the strength of the time-series, we can now construct an index which captures the
changes in the cost per square foot for an average building type. To do this, an average
building type of a given amount of square feet, story height and frame was run through
the model for each year analyzed. The cost calculated for each year was then indexed to
1982. Given the nature of relative cost within the hedonic model, the index itself remains
constant for any building specification since the cost in any year is a percentage of the
base year. However, the level of cost in nominal terms will vary depending upon the
type of building constructed. Still, the relative change of the nominal building cost will
be the same as indicated in the index for the particular MSA. An example is constructed
in table 11 to demonstrate the level of cost per square foot in Boston for various building
types.
By examining the table, one can see the how cost varies for different building
specifications. Except for two-decimal rounding errors, the indexed cost in a given year
will be a percentage of the 1982 base year cost. This will hold across each of the
specifications. Thus, costs in Boston varied from a low of $78.80 per square foot for a 5
story 100,000 square foot steel building in 1993, to a high of $134.18 per square foot for
a 40 story, 1 million square foot concrete structure.23 This example also demonstrates
the importance the index holds for constructing "value-engineering" models in response
to the discounts and premiums afforded by the coefficients of the estimated parameters.
If the model indicates a cost of $134.18 to build a concrete or load bearing frame
structure in contrast to a cost of $125.04 to construct a steel frame building with the same
volume
23 Again, caution should be used in extrapolating square foot costs beyond the relevant range of
the data. There wasn't an observation for a load bearing structure beyond six stories.
Table 11 - Hedonic Office Cost Comparison - Boston, MA.
Building Quality Characteristics
No. of Stories 10 2U 20 10 10 40 40 40
Frame Type Steel Steel Steel -Concrete Concrete Steel Steel Concrete Concrete Steel
Square Feet/Floor 16400 16400 25000 16400 25000 25000 300001 25000 20000 20000
Total Square Feet 164000 164000 50000 16400 10000 12000 0000 10000 1 0000
Time Series-Cost Per Square Foot
1967 22.31 26.31 24.75 23.94 23.22 32.39 30.16 34.76 21.90 20.41
1968 21.73 25.63 24.11 23.32 22.62 31.55 29.38 33.86 21.34 19.88
1969 25.84 24.31 231.81 2-79.62 34.13 21.51 20.04
1970 25.22 275 27.98 27.06 26.25 36.61 34.09 39.29 24.76 23.07
1971- 25.24 29.77 28.01 27.09 26.27 36.65 34.13 39.33 2.8 23.10
1972 29.03 34.23 32.2 3T5 30.21 T 4.4 9.2 45.22 28.50 26.56
1973 30.38 35.83 33.70 32.60 31.61 44.10 41.07 47.32 29.82 27.79
1974 3318 314 3. 35.61 34.54 48.18 - 4.6 51.70 T.58 30.36
1975 38.77 472 43.01 41.60 40.34 56.28 52.41 60.39
1976 37.45 44.1 41.55 1 8. 54.38 506 58.35 36.77 34.27
1977 45T 5 50.19 48.54 W47.0 65.68 616 70.48 - T41 41.39
1978 39.17 46.20 43.46 42.03 40.77 56.87 52.95 61.02 38.46 35.84
1979 47.61 5. 52.82 51.09 49.55 69 T1 64.36 74.17 46.74 43
1980 50.67 59.77 56.22 54.38 52.74 73.57 68.51 78.95 49.75 46.36
1981 55.83 65.85 61.94 59.91 58.10 81.05 75.47 86.97 54.81 51.08
1982 5.70 65.70 61.80 59.77 57.97 80.87 75.30 86.78 54.69 56T9
1983 60.30 71.12 66.90 64.71 62.76 87.54 81.52 93.94 59.20 55.17
1984 66.86 78.86 74.18 71775 69.5T 97.07 90.39 0T4.1 656T 61.17
1985 66.45 78.37 96.47 89.83 1035 .4 60.79
1986 71.62 84.48 79.46 76.85 74.54 103.98 96.82 111.58 70.31 65.53
1987 801T 94. 88.90 85.99 83.40 1T6T. 108.33 124T84 78.67 73.
1988 76.86 90.66 85.28 80.00 111.59 10 119.75 75.4 7
1989 8.62 143 93 9 9 128.66 119.81 138.07 87.01 81.08
1990 96.8 114.28 107.49 139 100.84 16 19 1 4 512 886
1991 100.04 117.99 110.98 107.35 104.11 145.23 135.24 155.84 98.21 91.52
1992 F90.T 106.59 100.26 96.98 945 1.0 2 7 47 88.73 82.681
1993 1 86.1 10I18 975.55 94 89.63 125.04 116.43 1134.18 84.5 78.
characteristics, the logical choice would be to build the steel frame structure assuming the
building codes allow this choice.
The index can also be used to determine the "hurdle" rent necessary to allow new
construction to occur. First, a proportional allowance should be added to the index which
accounts for any necessary site preparation work, consultant's fees as well as any other
incidental costs. Once these estimates have been made and added to the expected
building cost, one simply multiplies the nominal construction cost per square foot by the
current or expected capitalization rate. The resultant spread, in this simple model,
represents the "residual-to-the-land" since the capitalization rate embodies the yield
expected from the project. Thus, for our ten story steel structure in Boston, assuming
35% proportional additions for the items noted above, as well as assuming a cap rate of
9.6%, the minimum net effective rent necessary to cover the cost of development is
$16.20 per square foot. This figure does not include the cost of the land. Thus, a market
rent in excess of $16.20 net, would represent the residual to the land in this simplified
model.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH INFLATION
From the nominal cost/square foot model shown above, the commercial office
replacement cost index was calculated for each of the MSA's. "Replacement cost" is
used as the term to describe the index because the index represents the nominal price
necessary to construct the average building in any given year. The index captures both
the changes due to quality as well as the general level of prices in the economy. (The
indices are presented in tables 12 through 14.)
24 This figure is derived from statistics received by the American Council of Life Insurance for
Quarterly and Annual Totals for loans and interest rates for 1993.
25 "Triple-net" rents are assumed, that is, the tenant assumes common area maintenance, taxes,
and insurance.
Table 12 - Commercial Office Replacement Cost Index
Base Year 1982 = 100
Year Atlanta, GA Aurora, IL Boston, MA Charlotte, NC Chicago, IL Dallas, TX
_ Nominal Real Nominal Real No Real Real Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real
1967 35.58 102.81 29.16 84.25 40.05 115.72 28.60 82.63 - --- 27.90 80.60
1968 34.69 96.20 34.60 95.95 39.02 108.19 33.78 93.68 37.38 103.66 29.82 82.68
1969 33.79 88.86 45.19 118.82 39.33 103.42 34.38 90.39 37.63 98.94 33.36 87.72
1970 38.58 95.94 59.28 147.45 45.28 112.61 39.44 98.10 41.78 103.91 33.94 84.42
1971 41.25 98.29 50.19 119.59 45.32 107.98 45.41 108.20 44.82 106.80 34.93 83.23
1972 43.61 100.67 50.12 115.70 52.11 120.30 40.15 92.70 46.68 107.77 40.70 93.96
1973 47.91 104.12 65.43 142.20 54.53 118.53 50.56 109.89 50.23 109.18 43.86 95.33
1974 57.68 112.90 61.49 120.35 59.57 116.61 50.74 99.33 55.74 109.11 49.54 96.96
1975 56.67 101.64 72.62 130.25 69.59 124.83 63.18 113.32 54.77 98.24 52.24 93.71
1976 67.03 113.67 82.74 140.32 67.24 114.04 62.85 106.59 55.37 93.90 51.32 87.03
1977 73.54 117.11 74.01 117.85 81.21 129.32 77.10 122.78 63.75 101.51 53.97 85.94
1978 82.72 122.44 69.45 102.78 70.32 104.08 84.50 125.07 66.89 98.99 66.55 98.50
1979 82.73 109.96 83.83 111.43 85.47 113.61 91.39 121.48 80.78 107.37 74.81 99.43
1980 95.05 111.31 126.75 148.44 90.97 106.54 97.60 114.30 91.05 106.62 84.80 99.31
1981 92.59 98.29 141.75 150.48 100.22 106.39 94.84 100.69 91.51 97.14 86.48 91.81
1982 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1983 106.58 103.26 132.07 127.96 108.25 104.88 100.82 97.68 104.60 101.35 108.43 105.06
1984 110.73 102.84 140.30 130.31 120.03 111.48 106.81 99.20 102.57 95.26 113.54 105.45
1985 106.34 95.37 117.10 105.02 119.29 106.98 115.08 103.21 104.01 93.28 113.67 101.95
1986 112.31 98.89 127.04 111.85 128.58 113.21 112.98 99.48 107.49 94.64 115.45 101.65
1987 125.70 106.78 139.94 118.88 143.86 122.20 125.81 106.87 126.07 107.09 111.06 94.34
1988 125.60 102.45 142.51 116.24 137.99 112.56 130.31 106.29 124.71 101.73 110.32 89.99
1989 150.44 117.08 179.99 140.07 159.10 123.82 143.97 112.04 137.90 107.32 127.94 99.57
1990 169.11 124.86 162.83 120.23 173.94 128.43 142.24 105.02 157.11 116.00 125.45 92.62
1991 163.67 115.96 175.32 124.22 179.59 127.24 166.65 118.07 143.17 101.44 158.63 112.39
1992 147.87 101.71 155.84 107.19 162.24 111.59 151.33 104.08 142.44 97.97 178.59 122.84
1993 138.42 92.44 159.96 106.82 154.62 103.26 162.52 108.53 164.03 109.54 176.91 118.14
Descriptive Statistics
Comp. Avg. 5.16% -0.39% 6.51% 0.88% 5.13% -0.42% 6.65% 1.01% 5.85% 0.21% 7.08% 1.43%
Mean 90.38 105.03 102.94 120.54 97.32 113.62 90.85 105.17 89.71 102.65 85.34 96.47
Std.Dev. 41.44 9.03 45.77 16.53 44.51 8.21 41.71 9.92 39.02 5.65 44.46 10.20
Inflation [Compound Average: 5.57%]:[1ean: 82.48]:[Std. Dev.:36.40]
Table 13 - Commercial Office Replacement Cost Index
Base Year 1982 = 100
Year Fort Worth, TX Gary, IN Joliet, IL N. Jersey F New York
iNominal Real Nominal Real Nominal | Real Nominal Real Nominal Real
1967 33.83 97.73 31.33 90.51 27.63 79.84 33.85 97.80 33.78 97.59
1968 36.50 101.22 38.01 105.41 53.51 148.39 37.77 104.74 34.60 95.96
1969 30.82 81.05 35.60 93.59 54.80 144.09 36.56 96.13 38.12 100.24
1970 41.16 102.38 37.00 92.01 56.12 139.58 44.72 111.22 41.59 103.44
1971 43.33 103.24 44.85 106.87 57.35 136.65 53.11 126.56 48.03 114.45
1972 43.93 101.41 46.64 107.67 63.55 146.72 45.08 104.07 47.16 108.87
1973 45.40 98.68 48.39 105.16 58.95 128.11 61.17 132.95 55.62 120.88
1974 54.08 105.86 44.04 86.20 66.13 129.44 52.89 103.53 62.37 122.08
1975 53.39 95.76 46.83 84.00 62.46 112.04 62.37 111.87 59.69 107.07
1976 52.97 89.84 52.09 88.34 68.33 115.88 66.49 112.76 60.31 102.28
1977 60.53 96.38 56.63 90.17 68.05 108.36 63.26 100.73 68.81 109.57
1978 63.83 94.47 57.53 85.15 81.91 121.22 68.09 100.77 64.51 95.48
1979 79.15 105.21 63.94 84.99 71.21 94.66 75.38 100.20 76.93 102.26
1980 86.98 101.86 84.87 99.39 108.15 126.65 78.26 91.65 85.07 99.62
1981 96.83 102.79 118.41 125.70 117.97 125.24 95.70 101.59 92.03 97.70
1982 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1983 119.42 115.70 105.12 101.85 157.98 153.06 118.24 114.56 104.90 101.64
1984 124.01 115.18 89.75 83.36 92.43 85.85 121.88 113.20 119.16 110.68
1985 120.59 108.15 92.07 82.57 95.56 85.71 128.13 114.91 111.07 99.61
1986 122.75 108.08 91.11 80.22 116.36 102.45 114.85 101.12 118.76 104.56
1987 118.87 100.97 126.55 107.50 149.00 126.57 126.15 107.16 121.37 103.10
1988 122.77 100.15 132.59 108.16 143.97 117.44 133.40 108.82 130.55 106.50
1989 135.35 105.33 130.22 101.34 223.92 174.26 141.68 110.26 126.10 98.13
1990 135.61 100.13 138.52 102.27 171.20 126.40 138.41 102.20 143.04 105.61
1991 180.72 128.04 142.60 101.04 222.19 157.42 144.07 102.07 146.50 103.80
1992 188.10 129.38 138.25 95.09 189.60 130.41 154.70 106.41 167.97 115.53
1993 174.59 116.59 159.26 106.36 156.46 104.49 124.26 82.98 146.16 97.61
Descriptive Statistics
Comp. Avg. 6.27% 0.66% 6.21% 0.60% 6.63% 1.00% 4.93% -0.61% 5.58% 0.000%c
Mean 91.32 103.91 83.41 96.85 104.99 123.00 89.65 105.93 89.04 104.60
Std.Dev. 46.77 10.13 39.83 10.62 53.15 22.89 38.36 9.81 39.20 7.04
Inflation [Compound Average: 5.57%]:[Mean: 82.48]:[Std. Dev.:36.40]
Table 14 - Commercial Office Replacement Cost Index
Base Year 1982 = 100
YearH Oaland-CA F Raleigh, NC IISnFrancisco, CA San Jose, CA H ahngton DC
Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real
1967 --- --- 32.05 92.60 --- --- --- --- 34.90 100.84
1968 --- --- 36.30 100.66 --- --- --- --- 33.25 92.20
1969 35.82 94.20 37.60 98.86 31.29 82.27 25.88 68.04 37.78 99.35
1970 40.34 100.33 41.79 103.94 34.42 85.60 42.65 106.07 42.09 104.67
1971 42.26 100.69 43.30 103.17 37.01 88.19 44.51 106.05 44.48 105.99
1972 44.49 102.71 43.36 100.10 41.67 96.20 42.17 97.36 44.60 102.95
1973 39.95 86.83 55.52 120.67 37.20 80.85 43.61 94.78 47.19 102.56
1974 51.08 99.98 56.90 111.37 45.34 88.75 46.34 90.71 65.04 127.31
1975 60.40 108.34 59.66 107.01 45.87 82.27 53.17 95.36 68.23 122.39
1976 62.17 105.43 67.48 114.44 59.98 101.73 56.02 95.00 64.83 109.94
1977 69.45 110.59 76.11 121.20 50.28 80.07 59.38 94.55 69.89 111.29
1978 60.07 88.91 73.53 108.83 49.07 72.62 56.17 83.14 73.20 108.34
1979 82.34 109.44 85.48 113.62 69.67 92.60 80.22 106.63 79.64 105.86
1980 90.87 106.42 91.11 106.70 74.30 87.01 85.26 99.85 87.75 102.76
1981 93.95 99.74 93.39 99.14 88.89 94.37 89.60 95.12 104.97 111.44
1982 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1983 101.72 98.55 112.10 108.61 97.85 94.80 103.30 100.09 104.34 101.09
1984 116.37 108.08 113.99 105.88 95.85 89.02 108.57 100.84 106.48 98.89
1985 104.55 93.76 108.79 97.57 105.41 94.54 93.73 84.06 111.71 100.18
1986 114.44 100.76 118.21 104.08 100.00 88.05 107.69 94.82 117.26 103.25
1987 113.14 96.11 126.66 107.59 96.28 81.78 99.39 84.43 126.70 107.63
1988 115.87 94.52 125.27 102.18 99.54 81.20 102.65 83.73 124.67 101.70
1989 114.20 88.87 147.70 114.94 108.82 84.69 106.97 83.24 137.07 106.67
1990 133.85 98.82 155.02 114.46 119.17 87.98 115.27 85.11 138.28 102.09
1991 140.07 99.24 153.46 108.73 119.40 84.60 123.11 87.22 154.43 109.41
1992 142.22 97.82 142.69 98.15 138.02 94.93 131.50 90.45 140.11 96.37
1993 169.52 113.21 162.57 108.57 125.59 83.87 126.18 84.26 153.52 102.52
Descriptive Statistics
Comp. Avg. 6.41% 0.74% 6.20% 0.59% 5.72% 0.08% 6.54% 0.86% 5.64% 0.06%
Mean 89.57 100.13 91.11 106.41 78.84 87.92 81.73 92.44 89.35 105.10
Std.Dev. 36.78 6.74 40.54 7.00 32.51 6.77 31.00 8.96 38.28 7.15
Inflation [Compound Average: 5.57%]:[Mean: 82.48]:[Std. Dev.:36.40]
As with the coefficients for the dummy YEAR variables, the index reflects the same
changes. Cost have declined rapidly in Atlanta and Boston while they have increased in
Chicago and Dallas over the 1990-1993 period. Still, it is difficult to ascertain, for
instance, why costs escalated so much in Joliet in 1989 and 1991. Was there a shortage
of labor and materials which caused the index to increase 55% in one year? Given the
small sample of this market, a few expensive buildings with higher quality materials may
have caused the increase. 26
On a compound annualized basis, the average increase across all of the individual MSA
indices was 6.28% in comparison to the CPI deflator index which increased 5.6% over
the same period. Thus, the national average cost of an office building increased by
roughly by 68 points over inflation. Across the individual markets, though, there were
differences. For instance, New Jersey nominal prices increased 5.1%, while nominal
prices in Dallas increased 7.4% over the 26 year period. This could be indicative of
Dallas' growth and its movement from a small centralized central city in the 60's to a
diverse transportation and corporate hub in the 90's with higher quality buildings
. Atlanta and Boston experienced cost increases 20 to 30 points lower than inflation
while the midwestern cities experienced price movements from 110 to 130 points higher
than inflation. Over the long term, there doesn't appear to be a common reason for the
changes across markets.
26 The data indicates there were three offices constructed in 1989 and five in 1991, while there
were 12 and 15 buildings built in the respective preceding years. While this market certainly experienced
oscillations during the time frame in question, the drop in prices in light of increasing supply seems to
indicate this was a rise in "quality" rather than a price response to supply.
Looking at a shorter term period, from 1982 until the present, as would be expected given
the growth of the 80's, prices were greater than inflation by 60 to 200 points in a majority
of the MSA's. While New York hovered around inflation, New Jersey, San Francisco,
San Jose and Atlanta increased at a rate of roughly 40 to 130 points lower than inflation.
Again, there does not seem to be a simple explanation for these differences except to infer
that perhaps the access to material and labor encouraged lower costs in San Jose and
Atlanta and may have contributed to the real growth in those economies while in New
Jersey, the diverse mature economy didn't require the amount of resources necessary to
construct new buildings which would presumably fuel price increases. Nonetheless,
prices over the long and near term have held close to inflation. The volatility though, as
measured by the standard deviation, presents some interesting observations.
Dallas, despite its higher than average price over inflation, has had the most steady price
movements over the 26 year period, while smaller cities like Aurora and Joliet have
experienced extreme fluctuations in the range of 18.8% to 29.3%. With respect to the
stock cycle, which we will address in a moment, there did not seem to be a relationship
between the amount of correlation in the stock and price cycle and the level of volatility
in prices. Nonetheless, cities like Chicago, Raleigh, Dallas, Atlanta, New York,
Washington and Boston experienced price fluctuations lower than 9.1%. Fort Worth,
Oakland, Aurora, San Jose, New Jersey experienced price fluctuations greater than
11.6%. Thus, one causal relationship that may exist would be the given MSA's
percentage of employment with the FIRE or service sectors. Certainly, for those cities
which experienced lower volatility, cost may not inhibit the growth of office supply as
much as those cities which experience higher volatility.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH "MEANS"
The "Means Construction Cost Index" is a popular industry standard which approximates
the cost per square foot of a given structure type over time. The Means index has been
characterized as not capturing the actual cost of construction, thus the figures that result
are oftentimes held suspect. Still, it is probably the most widely used "rule-of-thumb"
index. As shown in the following charts, the Means index for each MSA is compared
with the Office Replacement Cost Index (ORCI).
What is revealing about the comparison, is the general tendency for the ORCI to track
quite closely with Means. As might be expected though, the ORCI bounces along on
either side of the Means index. Thus, while the two indices follow a similar general
trend, the Means index does not capture the subtle variations of the ORCI. Still, given
the Means index computation, it covers the general movements of cost of all building
types, not merely offices. Thus, one should expect the deviations from the Means index
for the ORCI.
When we consider the "real" indices over time, the national index reveals the real cost of
buildings have increased 9.68% over the 26 year period. This change in real prices either
suggests additional "amounts of quality" changes over time or the construction of
buildings with lower returns to scale. However, certain markets, like New Jersey and
New York, have experienced lower real prices from 1967. Additionally, virtually all of
the markets experienced a surge in prices relative to the means index in roughly the
period 1989 to 1991. This time frame marks the strongest "visual" departure from
Means. Escalating lumber and fuel prices during this time, in response to both national
and international events, may have caused the increase. Loan commitments27 were still
on the rise through the end of 1989. This may have induced rising prices as well.
As reported by the American Council of Life Insurance.
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Chicago, IL. Office Cost Indices
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Dallas, TX Office Cost Indices
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Fort Worth, TX Office Cost Indices
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Gary, IN Office Cost Indices
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Northern New Jersey Office Cost Indices
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New York Office Cost Indices
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Raleigh-Durham Office Cost Indices
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Washington D.C. Office Cost Indices
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Certainly the buildings in those cities did not decrease in quality over the time period,
however, there may have been less speculative building.
If we consider real prices from 1967 to 1990, there is a much more dramatic price
increase. The graphs indicate a sharp increase in prices in most markets at approximately
this same time period. Atlanta's price increase represented a change in real terms of 40%
versus a change of negative 8% over the longer period. Boston experienced a 23%
increase over the shorter interval versus 3.25% increase over the longer interval and
Charlotte experienced a rise of 31% over the shorter term and 20% over the long term. In
Chicago, prices grew 17% over the shorter term and 11% over the longer term. This
National Office Cost Indices
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pattern suggests the nation constructed a different "level" of building in 1991 than we do
today. This is certainly true given the restraints the capital markets have imposed upon
real estate in the last few years. Thus, it appears with increased capital, the market built
buildings which had a higher level of quality.
Chapter 5
STOCK/COST CYCLES & THE ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY
For the following graphs, the percentage of new supply relative to the level of the
existing stock was graphed in relation to the real cost per square foot of office
construction. The periodic FW Dodge data was added to a stock series (starting in 1967)
provided by CB Commercial. Real cost terms were used in constructing the charts in
order to extract rising prices due to the general change in prices.
From these charts, we explore an MSA's ability to add stock. If the real cost increases in
response to a large percentage increase in the supply relative to the stock (or, figuratively,
the supply/stock ratio), then we would expect that costs may act to inhibit the growth of
supply. From this, we might infer the office market must bid up the price to build these
assets in an effort to secure the necessary resources. If, on the other hand, costs do not
rise relative to the supply/stock percentage, we might infer that a particular MSA has a
diverse construction market and/or there is an "ebb & flow" in the construction market
with respect to other industries or projects "demanding" construction inputs. That is to
suggest that the construction market is mobile between project types and that negatively
correlated cycles exist between the office market and other construction markets. Also, if
prices do not rise, the cost of construction will not act to inhibit the growth of supply.
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With the exception of San Jose and New Jersey, the correlation between the percentage of
new stock in relation to the existing supply and the real cost of the supply is negative.
Thus, cost likely does not act to inhibit the flow of supply in these markets. Even when
the percentage of space being added was large with respect to the stock in the earlier
periods, say 1967-1969, real costs dropped substantially. In Chicago, the real price
dropped by nearly 4% even as the supply/stock ratio increased by roughly 1%.
In eight of the twelve markets analyzed though, real prices have declined since about
1992 or 1993. In Charlotte, Chicago, Oakland and Washington D.C., prices have risen.
With respect to the correlation, there does not seem to be a general trend except to say
that the four markets mentioned are negatively correlated.
Referencing the previous graphs comparing the ORCI and Means indices, those markets
which indicated a sharp increase in real prices from 1989-1991 also indicate a sharp
departure from the trend in the supply/stock ratio. After incurring declines until about
1987 or 1988, there is a sharp increase. Of late, all of the markets have settled to a
nominal supply/stock ratio of approximately 0.1% to 0.5%. Certainly this reduced
amount of new supply is in response to both regulatory and capital market restraints.
However, these additions to supply may shed new light on the level of obsolescence in a
given market.
Considering supply elasticity, a bivariate regression test was conducted on certain
markets. Real cost per square foot was used as the dependent variable, while the
supply/stock ratio (as a percentage) was used as the independent variable. The year was
also used as an independent variable to detrend the series. The results of the tests are
shown in Table 15 along with changes in real cost per square foot assuming a given
change in the supply/stock ratio.
The results of the tests are not significant at the 95% level with only a few exceptions.
Dallas, Fort Worth and Washington D.C. reported reasonable r-squares. The t-stats in
each each of these markets were significant for the intercept and year, but were not
significant for the stock/supply ratio. Given the correlation as shown in previous graphs,
we would not necessarily expect a strong linear relationship between the variables. In
order to increase the predictive capacity of this model, future research may include
information relative to the level of construction activity in the market to ascertain the
level of "total activity" in the market and its impact on cost.
Table 15-Cost Changes Relative To % Change In The Supply/ Stock Ratio
City Descriptive Statistics Cost Change as Result 01% Change:New to Stoc~k
_____ ntercept Year~1 upp y toc . quare o o o
Atlanta Coej. -43.23621 0.04641  -0.0957 0.1048 49.16 49.15 49.15
tt -. 174 0.377 -1.101 49~~~~49~T
U.0 0.00-UT -0.0}-O
Boston Coe. . . . 0.1188 59.28 57.00 7
t ta t 0.52 -0.38 -1.95. 2 5.4
Charlotte Coejj. -59.4051 0.0569 -15.158 7 0.2'/00 53.87 52.51 5.1
t Sat 0.216 0.405 2.18253.'/2 51.75 50.99
t ta =. - 0.4 05 -. 198 
- -- 0.lb - 0.-76- -. 2
Chicago Coeff. 1133.80611 -0.03951 -10.17391 0. 0160 549 5.7 5.7
t tgat . -0. - .- ~~537 3
Dallas C oeff. -982.29231 0.52051 2.61761 0.5795 . 5
t~~ tat -- 7 ...2 ~~5'T'
Fort Worth Coejj. -821.37321 0.44051 4.21901 0.4075 57.06 57.06
tE t -3.585 3.810 0.60~~-5'6.72 57.2
New Jersey Coeff. 728.1851 -0.3362 -35.7536 0.0895 54.48 54.48
tMat 1.663 -1.522 -1.07~~~573 T ~~56 ~-50~90
New York Coeff. 453.99281 -0.19401 -82.38201 0.1954 66.53 59.1 59.11
tat . . -. 65.70 5 U
-0.82 -4.12 -8.24
Washington DC Coeff. 529.6844 -0.2375 -35.6200 U.3112 55.9 527 52
t tat . -2. -3. ~~55~63 51 ~~~~T9~22
Oakland Coeff. 1 131.88611 -0.03501 -6.94621 0.0251 6 61.52 6.
t tat 0.51 -0.2719 -0.7520 6 61 60.82
-0.07 -0.35 -0.69
San Francisco Coej. 43.9957 0.0097 -2.25261 0.0017 63.28
t Stat 0.1122 0.0491 -0.10346
-0.02 -0.11 
-02
San Jose Coeff. 91.35181 -0.01751 13.21251 0.1205 565 57.70 57.70
t Stat 0.1521 -0.0582 0.87035 58.36 59.02
Italics represent real dollar cost changes.
Sources:FW Dodge & CB Commercial
Utilizing the output from the model nonetheless, the change in cost relative to an increase
in the supply/stock ratio was calculated. As would be expected, as the ratio increased, the
price change was amplified. San Jose, Fort Worth and Dallas indicated small increases in
price as the ratio of construction to the stock level increased. The other cities indicated
price decreases as the ratio increased. New York reported the largest increase and was
followed by New Jersey, Washington D.C. and Boston. Can we infer from the data that
those cities which reported lower costs (as the ratio increased) also represent MSA's
which produce structures with increasing returns to scale and thus provide greater
productivity?
To answer this question, a bivariate regression model was developed to address cost
elasticity at the MSA level. Real cost per square foot was again used as the dependent
variable. The amount of new supply, in thousands of square feet, and the year were used
as the independent variables. The cost elasticity for each MSA was then calculated over
the interval of 500,000 to 1 million square feet as well as the interval of 1 to 1.5 million
square feet utilizing the output from the tests. The results are shown in Table 16.
Table 16-Cost Elasticity at the MSA Level
City Descriptive Statistics Range of Supply
I intercept Year New quare . - 1. mil1-[.5li.
Atlanta Coeff. -251.335 0.15128 -0.000240 0.0961 0.9952 0.9928
t Stat -1.225 1.45805 -0.982730
Boston Coeff; -76.336 0.06873 -0.000503 0.1007 0.9917 0.987
t Stat -0.370 0.65897 -1.529543
Charlotte Coef. -474.077 0.26607 -0.00166= 0.2101 0.9700
t Stat 7 2.29936 -1.625995
Chicago Coej. 63.485 -0.00384 -0.000144 0.0319 0.9974 0.9961
t Stat . -0.04642 -0.87006
Dallas Coeff. -937.975 0.49822 0.000036 0.5779 1.0007
t Stat -5.366 5.64079 0.374035
Fort Worth Coef -75 0.40614 0.000189 0.3996 1.0033 .005
t Stat 372 3.98177 0.208842
New Jersey Coef. 36331 -0.15353 0.000434 0.0512 1.0075 1.0113
t Stat 1.289 -1.07865 0.360973
New York Coeff. 383. -. 1583 -. 000364 0.1750 0.9946 0.99
t Stat 1.20-1.32647 -2.211408
Washington DC CoeJ. 80.065 -U.01194 -0.000150 0.0648 0.9973 0.9960
t Stat - .7 -0.18 -1.182437
Oakland Coeff. 24. T9 -0.000322 0.0250 0.994 0.99
t Stat 0.099 0.15391 -0.750434
San Francisco Coeff; -50.661 0.05693 0.000311 0.0132 1.0049 17
t Sat -0.63 0.36383 0.515589
San Jose Coej. 619.195 -. 4501 0.2190 103 1
t Stat 2.052 -1.86556 1.904634
Sources:r W Dodge m
Cost Elasticity > 1, indicates decreasing returns to scale
Cost Elasticity = 1, indicates constant returns to scale
Cost Elasticity < 1, indicates increasing returns to scale
Again, the test results are not significant. Only Dallas indicated any promising results. A
negative sign for NEW indicates a reduction in cost as the supply increases. The amount
of the reduction is dependent upon the additive nature of the coefficient. In Atlanta , for
instance, a level of new supply of 1 million square feet represents a reduction in cost of
$0.24. In Charlotte, a similar level reduces the cost by $1.66 per foot.
Commercial
Given the intervals stated above, the cost elasticity for each market resulted in nearly
constant returns to scale. Comparing tables 15 and 16, those cities which indicated a
reduction or increase in cost as a result of the supply/stock ratio in table 15, also indicated
increasing or decreasing returns to scale, respectively, in all but two markets. In New
Jersey and San Francisco, the economies of scale were reversed from the changes
associated with the supply/stock ratio. In each of these instances, the models did not
indicate a high level of explanatory power. The insufficient results are likely the result of
omitted variables or an insufficient model. Even for the balance of the cases, the tests
were not significant. Does this indicate that real costs per square foot do not hold a
strong relationship to the level of supply or that cost does not act to inhibit the level of
new supply? The following section addresses these questions through the construction of
a supply forecast model.
Considering the supply forecast, the level of new supply, as reported in the FW Dodge
data, was the dependent variable used in the linear model. For the independent variables,
the real cost, as calculated from the hedonic model, the one-period lagged level of
vacancy, as reported by CB Commercial and the one-period lag in "real yield" on
commercial mortgages, as reported by the American Council of Life Insurance, were
used. The results of the tests are shown in Table 17.
Table 17 - Supply Forecast Statistics
City ff Intercept iReal Cot Vacancy-1 Real Yld-1 R Square
Atlanta Coefficients 226.74 166.01 -398.87 773.95 0.5138
t Stat 0.04 1.11 -2.79 4.16
Boston Coefficients 8209.76 -92.94 -126.68 405.45 0.2653
t Stat 1.25 -0.80 -1.23 2.34
Chicago Coefficients 20416.41 -203.58 -428.63 677.42 0.4213
t Stat 1.78 -0.99 -3.22 2.90
Dallas Coefficients -964.19 294.52 -618.45 1069.19 0.2782
t Stat -0.07 0.96 -2.78 1.86
New York Coefficients 24652.77 -219.13 -637.80 242.82 0.4738
t Stat 1.93 -1.16 -3.99 0.83
San Francisco Coefficients 11396.28 -95.12 -379.51 299.32 0.3632
t Stat 2.17 -1.24 -3.39 1.95
Washington DC Coefficients 5474.54 -1.87 -123.95 1319.42 0.2883
t Stat 0.25 0.00 -0.44 2.16
In all cases, the real cost was not significant at the 95% level. In
vacancy and yield variables were significant at the 95% level. As
most cases, the lagged
might be expected, the
signs for these variables were appropriate. For the yield variable, an increase in the yield
suggested an increase in the supply while an increase in the vacancy rate resulted in a
reduction to supply.
Considering the time frame of the tests (from 1969-1993), non-recourse loans were
popular. Thus, a causal relationship may result between the yield on mortgages and the
level of supply if it is true that the supply of funds from the capital markets had a greater
effect on the supply of space in relationship to the fundamental economics of the office
market. That is to say that lenders increased the cost of funds to insure against real estate
risk as opposed to either restraining the level of capital or requiring recourse loans. With
respect to the magnitude of each of the parameters in the model, real yield increases the
supply to a greater degree than do either real cost or vacancy act to reduce the level of
supply. In all cases, the real cost inhibits supply to a much lesser degree than does the
level of vacancy in a market. As such, in the final analysis, history has indicated that the
real cost of commercial office space has had minimal influence on restraining supply.
Chapter Six
CONCLUSION
In an efficient market, how do we reconcile a level of supply greater than the amount
necessary to cover obsolescence if the cost of the supply is greater than the replacement
cost? Demand theorists suggest that there is a dynamic structural vacancy rate as has
been applied to the labor markets. If one considers the vacancy rate as a proxy for
supply, then this theory is valid. Some demand theorists also suggest obsolescence is
rising. Given the cycles in the market, one might suggest that obsolescence is dynamic,
with respect to quality, depending upon the speed with which capital flows into the
market. The folklore in the 80's suggested, "so long as they keep the money flowing,
we'll keep building!" Thus, if there is a "risk-free" dollar to be spent, it just may be
spent.
These issues appear to be reconciled if we consider supply within the context of the
bid/rent curves proposed by Alonso. From the research undertaken, cost elasticity and
normal profits suggest there exist a series of quality/cost curves which determine the level
and type of supply which enters the market in response to demand and the willingness for
participants to pay for a number of "units of quality."
As was exhibited in the table addressing the cost per square foot for space in Boston, the
cost per square foot will depend upon the quality characteristics of the building and the
cost elasticity of those characteristics. As noted, the costs will vary over the range of
quality. The level of rents in a given marketplace is determined in a competitive property
market. Thus, the rents, in this efficient market, are static over the short run, but assume
different levels for different building types. Therefore, with cost elasticity fixed in the
supply market, and rents fixed in the property market, the capitalized value of the rents
discriminate over the type of structure constructed, which will allow a residual to the
land. Since the capitalized values vary with the supply of capital provided by the capital
28
markets, the quality level of assets will vary over time . That is, in the presence of fixed
cost elasticity, the quality of assets constructed will shift from one level, or quality/cost
curve to another level, or curve.
History has provided us with examples of these capital flows and the changes in quality
which resulted. The wonderful structures constructed in the 1980's in response to
"favorable" capitalization rates, as well as the supply of capital which flowed onto the
market in the early 70's from real estate investment trusts, support this hypothesis and
reconcile the issues regarding a dynamic structural vacancy and a dynamic rate of
obsolescence.
Future research can explore the segments of quality and additional "quality characteristics
or attributes" which exist in the market in an effort to establish a more narrowly defined
replacement cost index with greater explanatory power. Further research can also explore
the variables which cause changes to the index in order to support supply forecasting.
28 Exceptions to zoning regulations are noted.
Within the context of the quality/cost curves, we can then address the demand functions
of this segment of the market. Such research may further our understanding of the
oscillations of the commercial office market.
Appendix
F.W. Dodge Database
Summary New of Records
MSA Observations Total Sq. Feet Value in 1993$* # of Stories
Atlanta, GA 4145 131001.3 9,072.04 8562
Aurora, IL 306 5088.2 404.34 446
Boston, MA 2448 93196.5 9,218.49 6167
Charlotte, NC 1708 32868.3 2,621.87 2786
Chicago, IL 5152 194188.5 17,676.44 11328
Dallas, TX 5114 177025.3 13,256.26 10189
Fort Worth, TX 2008 30367.7 2,190.90 2807
Gary, IN 717 5537.1 451.31 875
Joliet, IL. 240 2284.2 194.02 294
New Jersey 1578 55324.8 5,033.46 3236
New York City 1660 162413.8 22,055.74 8885
Oakland, CA 2037 63023.5 5,330.67 3523
Raleigh-Durham, NC 1321 28517.1 2,130.49 2271
San Francisco, CA 1409 77938 7,879.07 420
San Jose, CA 1928 45072.4 3,665.75 3026
Washington D.C. 3969 269733.1 21,907.33 13223
Total 35740 1373579.E 123,088.18 8182C
*Value in millions of 1993
Printed with permission from F.W. Dodge Co.,
MSA HFrame Type Unit Frequency Distribution Total
Aurora 232 92 12 1 31 2 12 1 U V9 401
Atlanta -= -79 124 (32 75 32 P - 7
Boston -T1 -7 - - 2 7 7 -7 - T T3-M
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Chicago 07 85 2 T T7 T - M -- F57W
DallaHs -7 1 1588 258 393 112 49 250 54 54 2 11 76 5966
Fort o 34 51 27 61_ 7 - 7--' 7 - - _T__43
Gary, IN 37 -TOT 1 6 T1 73 2 fl_2
Joliet, IL 185-77 25 M - T - - T ---- U
New ork ity -TM 7 Ti 160 17 -76 12 8 2278.
Northern New Jersey 971 765 W 2 23 16 1 6 3 2 108 219
Oakland _W _= _= -7 T2 33 2= T=
Raleigh-Durham 6 75 171 50 --n
San Francisco 7 --= -M -7 - -2 288 7 ___7 = T
San Jose 887 163 4 5 6 57 287 -15 4 204 2183
as ington >T 183 6 3 1-7
rame Fype total T -3 -707 -76 - 2 - 3 -4 -799
79o7 . .o -57W o TrW. o7.o .77o. W 0. . o% o ._ To . 1 . o
Source: F.W. Dodge
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Atlanta 4.% -. o .71o .Z -7.o .o .7o .o .o .7 o . - 13 .
Boston .76o .7o T.o .=o .T o .o .o .To %.To -_ .o .o T o
Charlotte . o o .5o .=o =.7o .6% .oo -777o T ~ .7o . Wo T-9o
Chicago . 20. 1. . . o.8 .0.5% o 0.0 .2 .2%
alas .7 o .o T o .. o 4.2% 0 o .97 o 9o . . 2%. o .3o
Fort Worth . To .=o . o 3o .75o . .o .7o .77o .=o . o .7o
Gary, IN I n o . o . o .o .=o .= o .=o .o .o .o .-=o .77o
Joet, . 67% 1.5% 7. 2.1% 2.1% 2.5 % o . o U.% .1 0.3 0 2.5%
New York City . /o . o Vo.o .% T~o .o . o 7. oT. o .F o .o .6
Northern New Tersey 47o .W o .6 o .o . o 77 o o . o 7o 7o .o .o
akan . o 92o .=o .o .o . o n .o . -9.7 o -F .Wo oT-.o
leig - ur am . 32.0% 11.o . 3..% o .12% 4.7 % .o ..6% 2..% o 0.4% .0 1.4o
an ran1cisco .577o o . . . . o .7 o9.. 3.. 7.o . o..o .76 1o
San Jose . o . o . o . o . o . 6o . o .: o .o W7% . 9.3o
Washington .C 40=o .=o T o .=o .7o .=o 5o .Wo TI =.o .o .6o
Source: F.W. Dodge
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